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Daily-diary studies and experience sampling studies examine day-to-day variations in affect 
using different rating types: The former typically collect retrospective affect reports at the 
end of the day, whereas the latter collects multiple momentary assessments across the day. 
The present study examined the convergence of (aggregated) momentary assessments 
collected repeatedly within a day and retrospective assessments collected at the end of the 
day. Building on prior research on the memory-experience gap and the peak-and-end rule we 
predicted that participants would report more intense retrospective affect than aggregated 
momentary affect, and that retrospective affect would be biased towards the peak and the 
most recent affect of the day. Based on socio-emotional selectivity theory and the strength 
and vulnerability integration model, age differences in these convergence indicators were 
expected. Findings from two age-heterogeneous ecological momentary assessment/daily-
diary hybrid studies (N=242, 25-65 years; and  N=175, 20-79 years) revealed (a) a memory-
experience gap for negative affect (more intense retrospective ratings than aggregated 
momentary ratings) that is attenuated with advancing age, (b) only a small memory-
experience gap for positive affect for very old adults (66-79 years), but not younger adults, 
(c) relatively high convergence of aggregated momentary ratings and retrospective ratings 
despite (d) small biases of retrospective negative affect ratings towards peak and most recent 
negative affect. Findings suggest that both rating types can discriminate “good days” from 
“bad days” and provide overlapping but not necessarily exchangeable information. 
Keywords: daily diary; ambulatory assessment; well-being; measurement burst; affect 
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How was your day? Convergence of aggregated momentary and retrospective end-of-
day affect ratings across the adult life span 
Affective experiences such as anger, sadness, joy or happiness change dynamically within 
individuals across various time scales (Augustine & Larsen, 2012). Although quickly 
changing affect dynamics receive an increasing amount of attention in the psychological 
literature (e.g., Kuppens, 2015), there is also a large body of research targeting slower, day-
to-day variations in affective experiences. In these daily-diary studies, participants are asked 
once a day (typically at the end of the day) to report their daily experiences as well as their 
affective experiences for that day (e.g., Almeida, 2005; Brose, Schmiedek, Lovden, & 
Lindenberger, 2011). There are many advantages of investigating affect using this 
methodology (Augustine & Larsen, 2012; Schwarz, 2012), one of which is that it should 
mitigate retrospective biases compared to studies using longer recall periods. Arguably, 
reporting on affect experienced today places less demand on memory and cognitive heuristics 
than, for example, recalling, aggregating, and reporting on affective experiences in the last 
week, month or year. Nevertheless, inquiring about affect today still requires engagement of 
memory and heuristic processes, opening the possibility that recollection of today’s affect 
will not perfectly align with experienced affect throughout the day.  
 The aim of the present study is to examine the within-person convergence of 
aggregated momentary affect and end-of-day retrospective affect. That is, we examined 
whether end-of-day assessments and aggregated momentary assessments are both capable of 
discriminating “good days” from “bad days” within a person. Furthermore, we examined 
potential age differences in these convergences using age-heterogeneous samples from two 
ecological momentary assessment/daily-diary hybrid studies.  
Differences between Momentary and Retrospective Affect Ratings 
END-OF-DAY AFFECT  5 
 
 
In their accessibility model of emotional self-report, Robinson and Clore (2002) 
postulated that momentary reports of an emotional state (“How do you feel right now?”) 
differ qualitatively from retrospective self-reports. Specifically, momentary reports can be 
made based on experiential knowledge that is available in the current moment only and 
cannot be “re-lived” after the affective episode has passed. Because emotional experiences 
are fleeting, retrospective assessments rely on reconstructive processes of the prompted event 
(“How did you feel when X happened?) or time frame (“How did you feel last week?”). 
When the prompted emotional report relates to a specific episode or to a short time frame, 
episodic memory processes are engaged that retrieve information on the event or time frame. 
The more specific the prompted event is or the shorter the recall period, the more accurate 
retrospective assessments are expected to be (Schwarz, 2012). Retrospective reports of daily 
affect (“How did you feel today?”) should therefore reasonably accurately reflect the “true” 
experiences of the day (i.e., be highly related with aggregated momentary experiences), given 
the rather short retrieval time of one waking day.  
Divergences between aggregated momentary affect ratings and retrospective ratings 
have sometimes been considered as evidence for biases in retrospective assessments. 
Alternatively, however, it could also be speculated that these differences might be driven by 
unprecise assessment of momentary affect: For example, asking individuals many times for 
their current affective state might interrupt their daily routines, causing them to carelessly 
respond in some cases (Aldwin, 2010). Therefore, differences between aggregated 
momentary ratings and retrospective ratings should not offhandedly be considered as 
evidence for psychometric superiority of momentary assessments. Similarly, Conner and 
Barrett (2012) suggested that differences between these rating types should not be taken as 
evidence that aggregated momentary ratings have, in general, higher validity than 
retrospective ratings: although momentary ratings might be more valid representations of 
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current subjective experiences than retrospective ratings (construct validity), their ability to 
predict future behavior (predictive validity; Cronbach & Meehl, 1955) might not necessarily 
be higher. Indeed, some research indicates that retrospective affect ratings may actually in 
some cases predict future behavior better than aggregated momentary affect. For example, 
retrospective assessments of a vacation were more strongly related to the desire to repeat the 
experience compared to aggregated momentary assessments taken during the vacation (Wirtz, 
Kruger, Napa Scollon, & Diener, 2003), and retrospective pain ratings at the end of a 
colonoscopy (but not momentary pain ratings during the procedure) predicted return rates for 
a follow-up colonoscopy (Redelmeier, Katz, & Kahneman, 2003). That is, when it came to 
the intention to repeat the experience (vacation; colonoscopy) memories of the experience 
were better predictors than experiences collected in the moment.  
Conner and Barrett (2012) argue that the reason that aggregated momentary 
assessments and retrospective assessments are related to different outcomes is that they tap 
different aspects of the self. Specifically, these authors distinguish the experiencing self from 
the remembering self. The experiencing self can be assessed using momentary experiences 
and is hypothesized to be more closely related to physiological states and processes whereas 
the remembering self, which is measured using retrospective ratings, is often more predictive 
of deliberative future behavior (Conner & Barrett, 2012). Similar to Robinson and Clore’s 
(2002) accessibility model of emotional self-report, the differentiation between experiencing 
self and remembering self proposed by Conner and Barrett (2012) predicts less-than-perfect 
congruence between momentary ratings and retrospective ratings of affective states. The core 
difference between these two accounts is that the accessibility model attributes differences 
between the rating types to specific knowledge systems (experiential knowledge vs. episodic 
knowledge) whereas the account by Conner and Barrett (2012) assumes that these differences 
are primarily driven by the involvement of different (neuro-)biological structures that map 
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more on the experiencing self (e.g., the autonomic nervous system and the core affect 
network) or the remembering self (the default/long term memory network), respectively (see 
Conner & Barrett, 2012, for a detailed discussion of similarities and differences between 
these two accounts).  
In summary, it can be expected that aggregated momentary ratings and retrospective 
ratings of affective experiences will not perfectly converge. Nevertheless, these two rating 
types typically show some degree of convergence, as has also been shown in previous 
research (e.g., Röcke, Hoppmann, & Klumb, 2011). In the present work, we differentiate two 
types of convergence indicators that we discuss in the following sections: level convergence 
and correspondence convergence.1 
Level Convergence  
Level convergence relates to the degree to which momentary ratings and retrospective 
ratings concur with regard to the mean levels. Deviations from perfect level convergence 
result in what Miron-Shatz, Stone, and Kahneman (2009) referred to as the memory-
experience gap, that is, a “discrepancy between the average of experienced emotions and the 
overall evaluation of the experience, which is usually more intense than the averaged 
emotions” (p. 885). Prior research has largely reported results consistent with this 
discrepancy (Ben-Zeev, Young, & Madsen, 2009; Ganzach & Yaor, 2019; Lay, Gerstorf, 
Scott, Pauly, & Hoppmann, 2016; Miron-Shatz et al., 2009; Parkinson, Briner, Reynolds, & 
Totterdell, 1995; Thomas & Diener, 1990).  
Thus far, the exact mechanism underlying this phenomenon is unclear. Regarding the 
memory-experience gap for negative affect (NA), one possible explanation could be a 
negativity bias in retrospective assessments, that is, a tendency to utilize negative information 
more than positive information in one’s judgement (Vaish, Grossmann, & Woodward, 2008). 
                                                          
1 We borrowed this terminology from Stone, Broderick, and Schwartz (2010) who used the terms level 
differences and convergence differences in their work.  
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This bias might be more pronounced in cases when semantic memory processes are involved 
than when it is primarily episodic or experiential information that is used for individuals’ 
judgements. Support for this prediction comes from the study by Lay et al. (2016) who 
reported a positive association between neuroticism and the memory-experience gap for NA. 
However, a general negativity bias cannot account for findings reporting a memory-
experience gap for positive affect (PA). Notably, evidence for a memory-experience gap for 
PA is more inconsistent than for NA, which could suggest that person- or situation-specific 
moderators might be important here. Assuming that positive information is actually more 
relevant for retrospective judgements for some individuals (i.e., a positivity effect for some 
individuals) could explain part of the inconsistencies in previous studies. Largely in line with 
this assumption are results in the aforementioned study by Lay et al. (2016), showing that 
extraversion was positively associated with the memory-experience gap for PA. Taken 
together, a general tendency towards utilizing either positive or negative information for 
retrospective assessments could be one explanation for the memory-experience gap.  
A second, possibly complementary, explanation for the memory-experience gap is 
that retrospective ratings might be biased towards the peak affect experienced during the 
recall period (e.g., Ganzach & Yaor, 2019). When retrospectively judging the affective value 
of an event, individuals do not exclusively rely on the average affect they experienced during 
this episode but they also utilize the peak intensity of the emotion. Peak affect is salient and is 
therefore used in retrospective judgements of affective experiences (Stone, Schwartz, 
Broderick, & Shiffman, 2005). This is consistent with the finding that the peak of momentary 
affect ratings was associated with the memory-experience gap for high arousal positive and 
negative affect (Lay et al., 2016), suggesting that retrospective ratings are “pulled” towards 
the highest momentary affect rating in the observation period.  
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According to Fredrickson (2000) the impact of peak affect on retrospective ratings is 
adaptive because peak affect carries important personal meaning: Peak affect informs 
individuals about the capacities that were required to experience and endure the episode. 
When retrospectively assessing how demanding a situation was, it is, of course, informative 
to know what the average demand was, but the information on the maximum demand of this 
situation is also important. For example, if an individual decides whether she undergoes a 
second colonoscopy, her decision will be partly influenced by how painful the first 
colonoscopy was remembered (Redelmeier et al., 2003). The peak unpleasantness of the first 
colonoscopy informs the individual about the maximum pain she will endure and provides 
information that goes beyond the mean pain for the whole procedure. In addition to the peak, 
a second phase of the momentary affect distribution, the affect at the end of the episode, has 
also been postulated to predict retrospective ratings beyond the mean of the momentary 
experience (a phenomenon termed the "peak-and-end rule"; see Fredrickson, 2000). Similarly 
to peak affect, recent affect is hypothesized to be more salient and therefore utilized in 
arriving at retrospective evaluations of momentary states.  
Correspondence Convergence  
The second convergence indicator investigated in the present research, 
correspondence convergence, relates to the relative convergence between retrospective 
assessments and aggregated momentary assessments. Hence, in contrast to level convergence 
(which targets mean level differences between rating types, and hence, the memory-
experience gap), correspondence convergence can be operationalized as a correlation 
between rating types.2 An exemplary study investigating correspondence convergence has 
been reported by Röcke et al. (2011) who collected momentary affect ratings (up to 150 
momentary ratings collected across one year) and retrospective affect ratings at the end of the 
                                                          
2 Note that conceptually, level convergence and correspondence convergence can be unrelated. For example, 
retrospective ratings and aggregated momentary ratings could be perfectly correlated (perfect correspondence 
convergence), but their means could differ (memory-experience gap; lack of level convergence).  
END-OF-DAY AFFECT  10 
 
 
study period (recalled affect for the past twelve months) in a sample of older adults (72 to 91 
years). These authors aggregated the momentary ratings into a mean and correlated this 
variable with the individual’s retrospective assessment. Correlations ranged from .55 (NA) to 
.63 (PA) indicating good (but not perfect) correspondence convergence even for retrospective 
ratings across one year.  
Notably, these results are based on between-person correlations – these analyses target 
the question if inter-individual differences in experienced affect (aggregated momentary 
affect) are manifested in inter-individual differences in remembered affect (retrospective 
assessments) as well. In other words: They allow for assessing between-person 
correspondence convergence, that is, the question whether persons who felt better are also 
persons who remember to have felt better. Although an interesting question in itself, these 
analyses do not allow examining whether aggregated momentary ratings and retrospective 
ratings are equally well suited to discriminate days with more versus less PA (NA) within 
individuals. It remains an open question if both rating types capture the same within-person, 
across-day variation in affect (discriminate “good days” from “bad days” rather than “happy 
persons” from “unhappy persons”).  
In the present work, we focus on this within-person correspondence convergence of 
PA and NA. This requires that both momentary ratings and retrospective ratings of affect are 
assessed repeatedly within the same individuals. Parkinson et al. (1995) attempted to 
investigate within-person correspondence convergence using momentary affect ratings 
collected seven times per day for 14 consecutive days as well as retrospective affect ratings 
collected at the end of each day. To investigate within-person correspondence convergence 
these authors computed within-person correlations of aggregated momentary ratings (each 
day’s mean momentary affect rating) with retrospective ratings. On average, the within-
person correlations were reasonably high (.66 for PA and .68 for NA), suggesting good 
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within-person correspondence convergence, but the authors also reported substantial inter-
individual differences in the within-person correlations (ranging from -.23 to .94). Although 
informative, these results need to be considered with two major limitations in mind: First, the 
sample comprised only 30 participants limiting its potential to explore predictors of inter-
individual differences in within-person correspondence convergence. Second, although 
within-person correlations are conceptually an estimate for within-person correspondence 
convergence, there are methodological problems associated with this approach because each 
within-person correlation was based on a maximum of 14 data points only, resulting in a 
rather imprecise estimate (see Mejía, Hooker, Ram, Pham, & Metoyer, 2014). Modern data 
analytic tools such as multilevel models (MLM) are well suited to investigate both the 
average within-person association of aggregated momentary ratings and retrospective ratings 
and potential inter-individual differences therein. Furthermore, MLM also allow for 
investigating whether peak and most recent affect predict retrospective affect beyond mean 
momentary ratings (as would be predicted by the peak-and-end rule). A recent study 
(Ganzach & Yaor, 2019) has taken this data analytic approach, predicting retrospective, end-
of-day affect ratings from the aggregate of eight momentary PA and NA ratings per day, as 
well as peak and last affect of the day in a MLM. Only peak, but not last affect of the day 
predicted retrospective affect at the end of the day (within persons) above the day’s 
aggregated momentary affect. 
With the present study we sought to examine the degree of level convergence and 
within-person correspondence convergence of momentary and retrospective affect. To that 
end, we first examined mean level differences (as a measure of lack of level convergence) 
between today’s aggregated momentary affect (the mean of ratings collected throughout the 
day; “How do you feel right now?”) and retrospective affect with respect to this day (“How 
did you feel today?”). Next, we determined the degree of within-person correspondence 
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convergence by assessing the within-person association of aggregated momentary 
assessments and retrospective assessments. Third, we examined whether within-person 
variations in peak and most recent momentary affect predicted retrospective affect beyond the 
mean of this day’s momentary affect. Finally, we examined inter-individual differences in 
these effects and investigated one person-level variable that is predicted to be associated with 
these inter-individual differences: participants’ age.  
Age Differences in Convergence Indicators 
There are both theoretical considerations and empirical data suggesting that age might 
be associated with inter-individual differences in level convergence. For example, in a study 
on adults (25-74 years) by Charles et al. (2016), age differences in NA were reported to be 
stronger with increasing recall period (e.g., larger age differences for the assessment of NA 
last month compared to NA today). Furthermore, Lay et al. (2016) reported a smaller 
memory-experience gap for NA (but not PA) with advancing age. They interpreted their 
results as consistent with the perspective of a reduced negativity bias with advancing age (see 
Grühn, Scheibe, & Baltes, 2007; Mather & Carstensen, 2005). These considerations are 
further in line with the notion of Socioemotional Selectivity Theory (SST; Carstensen, 
Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999): According to this account, old age is associated with an 
increased motivation to pursue emotionally meaningful goals. Associated with this shift in 
motivational priorities is a change in information processing, manifested, for example, in 
better memory for positive emotional stimuli compared to negative stimuli. It is, however, 
unclear, whether this altered information processing is associated with a reduction in 
negativity (less preference for negative information), an increase in positivity (more 
preference for positive information), or both. For the memory-experience gap, an (age-
related) decrease in negativity should lead to a reduction of this gap for NA (reduced 
negativity in retrospective assessments), whereas an (age-related) increase in positivity 
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should be associated with an increase in this gap for PA with advancing age. Based on 
considerations of age-related reduced negativity and heightened positivity, we expected a 
negative association of age with the memory-experience gap for NA (i.e., with older age, a 
smaller memory-experience gap), and a positive association of age with the memory-
experience gap for PA (i.e., with older age, a greater memory-experience gap). 
We had no specific expectations whether age should predict within-person 
correspondence convergence (the size of the within-person association between aggregated 
momentary ratings and retrospective ratings) and we are not aware of any studies or 
theoretical accounts that have addressed this issue thus far. Regarding a different within-
person effect, the impact of peak affect on retrospective affect, we expected moderation by 
age. This hypothesis was derived from the Strength And Vulnerability Integration model 
(SAVI; Charles, 2010). SAVI stresses that older adults’ life-time of experience helps them in 
more effectively regulating their emotions by employing effective emotion regulation 
strategies when they are required. However, this effective emotion regulation is counteracted 
in situations of high physiological arousal due to heightened vulnerability and reduced 
flexibility in physiological stress responses (see also Wrzus, Muller, Wagner, Lindenberger, 
& Riediger, 2013). This implies that for older adults, it becomes particularly important to 
judge the capacity requirements for the situations they are about to enter. As explained above, 
peak affect carries this information, and retrospective assessments of affective experiences 
are influenced by peaks based on the assumption that they provide important salient 
information about capacity requirements (Fredrickson, 2000). Hence, for older adults, 
information on peak affect might be particularly important and, hence, be more strongly 
associated with retrospective affect assessments.  
The Present Study 
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In the present work, we investigated the convergence of retrospective assessments of 
positive and negative affect at the end of the day with the aggregated momentary assessments 
provided by the study participants in their daily lives. To that end, we employed two 
ecological momentary assessment (EMA)/daily-diary hybrid studies which followed 
participants for 14 (Study 1) and 21 (Study 2) days. In both studies, participants were asked 
to report their current affect five times per day, and at the end of each day they were asked to 
provide retrospective assessments of PA and NA of the current day. Based on prior research 
on the memory-experience gap (e.g., Miron-Shatz et al., 2009) we expected that retrospective 
assessments of both PA and NA would be higher than the mean of the momentary affect 
ratings collected on the respective day (Hypothesis 1). Furthermore, age effects on this 
difference were expected in a way that this gap would be reduced for NA, but exacerbated for 
PA, with advancing age (Hypothesis 2). We also assessed the degree of within-person 
correspondence convergence between aggregated momentary assessments and retrospective 
assessments. Building on early work by Parkinson et al. (1995) we expected high within-
person correspondence convergence on average (Hypothesis 3). We further expected, based 
on the peak-and-end rule (Fredrickson, 2000), that peak momentary affect (Hypothesis 4a) 
and last momentary affect of the day (Hypothesis 4b) would predict retrospective affect 
beyond this day’s mean momentary affect. Age differences in the impact of peak affect were 
expected based on SAVI (Charles, 2010), in a way that the impact of peak affect would be 
higher with advancing age (Hypothesis 5); age differences in the effect of last momentary 
affect were investigated in an exploratory fashion. Finally, inter-individual differences in 
both convergence indicators and the impact of peak affect were explored. 
Study 1 
Method 
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 The protocol of this study was approved by the Institutional Review Board at Albert 
Einstein College of Medicine (#2010-353; Study ESCAPE). 
Participants. Data were drawn from the first wave of a measurement burst study that 
was still ongoing when this research was conducted. Participants for this study were 
systematically sampled from registered voter lists in a specific zip code in the Bronx, NY. 
The neighborhood happens to be diverse (age, socioeconomic status, ethnicity), and this 
diversity is reflected in the sample that completed the study. Participants were sent letters of 
introduction in which the study protocol and the inclusion criteria were explained to them. 
These inclusion criteria were (1) age between 25 and 65 years, (2) ambulatory, (3) fluent in 
English, (4) no visual impairment that would interfere with operating the smartphones used 
for data collection, and (5) ability to operate the study smartphone throughout the day. Two-
hundred and forty-five participants started the study; three participants did not provide 
information relevant for the present work yielding a final sample of 242 participants (Mage = 
46.2, SDage = 11.1; 64.9% female). Most participants (63.0%) identified themselves as Non-
Hispanic Black, 8.9% as Caucasian, 17.5% as White Hispanic, 4.9% as Black Hispanic, and 
4.1% as Other. Approximately one quarter (24.4%) had received no college education (high 
school degree or less), 59.1% had received some college education or a college degree, and 
16.5% had a graduate or professional degree.  
Procedure. Upon recruitment and providing informed consent, participants were 
invited into the laboratory for cognitive testing and assessment of various questionnaires. 
During this baseline session participants were acquainted with the study smartphones that 
were used for the EMA. Participants followed the protocol (described below) on study 
smartphones for a two-day run-in period. After these two days, participants returned to the 
laboratory and could ask questions about the study procedure that arose in this training phase. 
Only those participants who had more than 80% compliance during the two-day run-in period 
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were invited to the full 14-day protocol. During the 14-day EMA, participants were instructed 
to complete a morning assessment upon awakening (this assessment is not relevant for the 
present research), five prompted assessments throughout the day (further referred to as beep 
assessments), and a participant initiated evening assessment prior to going to bed. On some 
days (n = 105), the evening assessment was completed prior to at least one momentary 
assessment; these days were removed from all further analyses to ascertain that all 
momentary ratings were taken before the respective retrospective ratings. The five beep 
assessments occurred in semi-randomized time intervals throughout participants’ waking 
days; beep assessments were scheduled between two and three hours apart. Of the 16,940 
possible beep assessments (242 participants, 14 days, five assessments per day), 14,101 
(83.2%) were completed; a similar compliance rate was obtained for the evening assessments 
(83.4% of the 3,388 questionnaires were completed). Only the measures relevant for the 
present study are reported (see Scott et al., 2015, for a description of the full study protocol). 
Data from this study have been reported in prior research targeting different research 
questions (Graham-Engeland et al., 2018; Hyun, Sliwinski, & Smyth, 2019; Majd et al., 
2018; Mathur et al., 2018; Scott, Kim, Smyth, Almeida, & Sliwinski, 2019; Scott, Munoz et 
al., 2018; Scott, Ram, Smyth, Almeida, & Sliwinski, 2017; Scott, Sliwinski et al., 2018; 
Slavish et al., 2018; Sliwinski et al., 2018; Stawski et al., 2018; Zawadzki et al., 2019).  
Measurements. Momentary affect was assessed at each randomly prompted signal 
throughout the day. Participants were asked “How ___ do you feel right now?;” they were 
queried separately for nine adjectives. Five adjectives assessed momentary NA 
(tense/anxious; angry/hostile; depressed/blue; frustrated; unhappy) and four assessed 
momentary PA (happy; pleased; much enjoyment/fun; joyful). Responses were given on a 
visual analog scale ranging from 0 (“not at all”) to 100 (“extremely”). The five negative 
affect items were averaged into a momentary NA score (within-person α = .83; see Geldhof, 
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Preacher, & Zyphur, 2014), and the four positive affect items were averaged into a 
momentary PA score (within-person α = .89). Retrospective affect was assessed at the end of 
each day during the evening assessments by asking participants “How ___ did you feel 
today?”. The same nine adjectives as in the momentary assessments were used. Again the 
five NA items were averaged (within-person α = .85) as were the four PA items (within-
person α = .89).  
Momentary ratings throughout the day were summarized into three indices: average 
momentary ratings, peak ratings, and last ratings. For each participant and day, the mean of 
all momentary PA items (NA items) was computed which resulted in one average momentary 
rating of PA and one average momentary rating of NA for each participant and each day. For 
each participant and day, we also extracted the highest rating of all up to five momentary PA 
(NA) ratings as an indicator for peak PA (peak NA) on this day. Additionally, for each 
participant on each day we extracted the last rating on the respective day as an indicator for 
last PA (last NA) to characterize the “end” affect for that day. If a participant missed the fifth 
beep on a given day, we used the rating provided on the fourth beep; if the fourth beep was 
missing as well, last affect on the respective day was set to missing for this individual.3 In 
summary, for every participant’s day we had four PA variables (retrospective PA, average 
momentary PA, peak PA, and last PA) and four NA variables (retrospective NA, average 
momentary NA, peak NA, and last NA). 
Data Analysis. Our analyses focused on the two indicators of correspondence 
between aggregated momentary and retrospective assessments of affect: level convergence 
and within-person correspondence convergence. To investigate level convergence we 
employed bivariate multilevel models for each affect dimension. To that end, for each day t 
of each participant i, the aggregated affect rating across all momentary ratings was computed 
                                                          
3 Across all observations, last affect was operationalized as affect at the fifth beep on 86.6% of all days, and as 
affect at the fourth beep in 8.0% of the days, respectively. No information on last affect was available on the 
remaining 5.4% of the days.   
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and stacked onto this person’s respective retrospective affect rating of the same day. By that, 
each person’s daily affect contained two observations: one observation which contained this 
day’s average momentary rating, and one observation which contained this day’s 
retrospective rating. A dummy coded variable (ratingtypeit) was created indicating which 
observation contained the aggregated momentary affect (coded as ratingtypeit = 0) and which 
observation contained the retrospective rating (ratingtypeit = 1). Next, we set up the first 
model in which the affect ratings were predicted by the dummy variable only. For NA 
(Model 1), the multilevel equations were: 
Level 1: 
𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡 = β0𝑖 + β1𝑖 ∙ ratingtype𝑖𝑡 + ε𝑖𝑡 (1) 
Level 2: 
β0𝑖 = 𝛾00 + υ0𝑖 (2) 
β1𝑖 = 𝛾10 + υ1𝑖 (3) 
Random intercept (υ0𝑖) and random slope (υ1𝑖) were allowed to covary across 
individuals (unstructured G-matrix). Separate Level-1 residual variances for aggregated 
momentary ratings and retrospective ratings were estimated. We then entered the main effect 
of age into the model as Level-2 predictor and controlled for participants’ gender at Level-2 
(to account for potential differences in affective well-being between men and women) and the 
day of the measurement at Level-1 (to account for changes across the observation period; 
Model 2). In the final model (Model 3), the interaction of age with rating type was added in 
order to investigate if differences between aggregated momentary ratings and retrospective 
ratings (the memory-experience gap) were associated with age: 
Level 1: 
𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡 = β0𝑖 + β1𝑖 ∙ ratingtype𝑖𝑡 + β2 ∙ day𝑖𝑡 + ε𝑖𝑡 (4) 
Level 2: 
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β0𝑖 = 𝛾00 + 𝛾01 ∙ age𝑖 + 𝛾02 ∙ gender𝑖 + υ0𝑖 (5) 
β1𝑖 = 𝛾10 + 𝛾11 ∙ age𝑖 + υ1𝑖 (6) 
The same models were run for PA as well (Models 4 through 6).  
To investigate within-person correspondence convergence, we first set up a series of 
multilevel models to determine the within-person associations of retrospective assessments 
and aggregated momentary assessments by predicting retrospective ratings from aggregated 
momentary ratings. We used an empty model as baseline to determine the within-person 
variance of retrospective NA / PA. In the next model, only one of the three predictors (mean 
momentary rating, peak momentary rating, last momentary rating) was entered as Level-1 
predictor into the model (predictors were centered on the person mean of all momentary 
NA/PA ratings). In the following models two predictors were entered simultaneously, before 
all three predictors were entered at once. Models were compared using likelihood ratio tests. 
Furthermore, we computed Level-1 pseudo-R² (Xu, 2003) as a measure of within-person 
variance explained by the model. This measure estimates the proportion of within-person 
variance that is explained by the predictors in the model (relative to the within-person 
variance in an empty model). Random slopes were omitted in these models to obtain 
interpretable R² estimates (for a discussion of these issues see LaHuis, Hartman, Hakoyama, 
& Clark, 2014). To examine the unique contributions of the three predictors in more detail, 
we estimated two more models: First, retrospective assessments were predicted by the three 
momentary affect predictors (mean momentary rating, peak momentary rating, last 
momentary rating), age, gender, and study day. Random slopes for the three momentary 
predictors were estimated in these models to explore inter-individual differences. Finally, the 
two-way interactions of these three predictors with age were added. For negative affect the 
resulting equations are: 
Level 1: 
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NA. retro𝑖𝑡 = β0𝑖 + β1𝑖 ∙ NA. mean𝑖𝑡 + β2𝑖 ∙ NA. peak𝑖𝑡 +  β3𝑖 ∙ NA. last𝑖𝑡 
+β4 ∙ day𝑖𝑡 + ε𝑖𝑡 
(7) 
Level 2: 
β0𝑖 = 𝛾00 + 𝛾01 ∙ age𝑖 + 𝛾02 ∙ gender𝑖 + υ0𝑖 (8) 
β1𝑖 = 𝛾10 + 𝛾11 ∙ age𝑖 + υ1𝑖 (9) 
β2𝑖 = 𝛾20 + 𝛾21 ∙ age𝑖 + υ2𝑖 (10) 
β3𝑖 = 𝛾30 + 𝛾31 ∙ age𝑖 + υ3𝑖 (11) 
Results 
 We used Mplus version 8.1 to compute correlations separately for the within-person 
and between-person level; variance components were estimated via empty multilevel models. 
As can be seen in Table 1 (upper diagonal), on the between-person level, average momentary 
ratings, retrospective ratings, peak ratings, and end ratings within each affect dimension were 
almost perfectly correlated, r > .90 for all. That is, participants who on average reported 
higher momentary NA (PA) also reported higher retrospective NA (PA). Within-person 
correlations (lower diagonal in Table 1) were also large and statistically significant, but 
somewhat lower compared to the corresponding between-person correlations. That is, on 
days when a participant reported higher momentary NA (PA), the participant also reported 
higher retrospective NA (PA).  
Insert [Table 1 here] 
Mean Level Comparisons (Level Convergence). To investigate the memory-
experience gap, we ran a multilevel model predicting affect from rating type. Results can be 
found in Table 2 (Model 1a) and Table 3 (Model 4a). For NA, retrospective ratings were 
higher by three scale points than the aggregated momentary ratings, b = 3.052, p < .001, 
whereas there was no significant difference in mean PA for these two rating types, b = 0.406, 
p = .285. Results from likelihood ratio tests showed that the random effect for rating type was 
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significant for NA, χ²(2) = 20.56, p < .001, but not for PA, χ²(2) = 0.44, p = .802. Hence, 
there were significant inter-individual differences in the memory-experience gap for NA, but 
not PA.  
To investigate age differences in affect ratings, we added participants’ age as 
additional predictor (as well as gender and study day as covariates). We found no main effect 
for age on NA, b = -0.353, p = .722, but a positive effect on PA, b = 2.587, p = .035, 
indicating that older age was associated with higher PA, but unrelated to NA (see Models 2a 
and 5a; Table 2 and Table 3). In a final step, two-way interactions of rating type with age 
were added; this step allowed us to assess if the difference in mean level between aggregated 
momentary ratings and retrospective ratings was associated with age. Only for NA, b = -
0.810, p = .024, but not PA, b = -0.307, p = .420, was there a statistically significant age x 
rating type interaction: This interaction indicates that the discrepancy between aggregated 
momentary affect ratings and retrospective ratings for NA was lower with advancing age.4 To 
illustrate the findings, Figure 1 depicts NA ratings separately for aggregated momentary 
ratings and retrospective ratings; age was divided into tertiles (25-40 years, 41-52 years, 53-
65 years; see Tables S1a-S1c in the online supplemental material, section A, for descriptive 
statistics by age group). As can be seen from this figure, retrospective NA ratings were higher 
than aggregated momentary ratings, but this difference was attenuated with advancing age. 
Follow-up analyses showed that for all three age groups, the difference between retrospective 
NA and aggregated momentary NA was statistically significant: 25-40 years: b = 4.297, p < 
.001; 41-52 years: b = 3.293, p < .001; 53-65 years: b = 1.564, p = .003. For PA, there were 
no differences between rating types in any age group, |b| < 1.111, p > .064 for all.  
                                                          
4We also tested whether there might be nonlinear age effects on the memory-experience gap by adding higher 
order polynomials of age (quadratic, cubic, quartic) as main effects and interactions with rating type. This did 
not improve model fit for either PA or NA, χ²(2) < 4.13, p > .126.  
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Including interactions of rating type with gender and day did not alter the results; none 
of these interactions were statistically significant (see Table S3 in the online supplemental 
material, section B). 
Insert [Table 2 here] 
Insert [Table 3 here] 
Insert [Figure 1 here] 
Predicting End-of-Day Affect (Correspondence Convergence). In the next set of 
analyses, we investigated the degree of relative convergence between aggregated momentary 
affect ratings and retrospective end-of-day ratings. Findings (see Table 4) suggest substantial 
overlap between the mean of momentary ratings and retrospective ratings on the within-
person level: Pseudo-R² = .353 (NA) and Pseudo-R² = .384 (PA). For NA, both peak and last 
momentary ratings uniquely predicted retrospective ratings above mean ratings. For PA, only 
the last rating, but not the peak rating, predicted retrospective ratings beyond the mean of 
today’s momentary ratings.  
Insert [Table 4 here] 
To further illuminate the unique contributions of aggregated momentary ratings, peak 
and last affect, as well as potential inter-individual differences therein, we added random 
effects for these predictors. Tables 5 and 6 show the results of these models (see Model 7a 
and Model 9a). For both PA and NA, last momentary ratings predicted end-of-day ratings 
beyond the mean momentary ratings. Peak ratings predicted retrospective ratings for NA, but 
not PA. Notably, random effects suggest that there were substantial inter-individual 
differences in the effect of mean, peak, and last momentary ratings on end-of-day 
retrospective assessments. To explore if these differences could be explained by age, we 
included interactions of these three predictors with age. However, this did not improve model 
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fit for either NA or PA, χ²(3) < 4.51, p > .211 for both, and none of the interaction effects was 
statistically significant (see Tables 5 and 6, Model 8a and Model 10a).  
We also examined whether convergence increased across time in study by entering 
interactions of aggregated momentary affect, peak affect, and most recent affect with study 
day. Including these three interactions did not improve model fit for either PA, χ²(3) = 7.24, p 
= .065, or NA, χ²(3) = 6.76, p = .080. For both outcomes, the aggregated momentary affect x 
study day interaction was not statistically significant, b = 0.011, p = .220 (PA), and b = 0.015, 
p = .206 (NA), respectively, providing no evidence for a change in within-person 
correspondence convergence across the observation period.  
Insert [Table 5 here] 
Insert [Table 6 here] 
Exploratory Analyses: Inter-individual Differences. We estimated for each 
participant three parameters per affect dimension: an estimate of the memory-experience gap; 
an estimate of the (zero-order) within-person association between aggregated momentary 
affect and retrospective affect; and an estimate of the incremental effect of peak affect on 
retrospective affect (above mean affect). These estimates were obtained as empirical Bayes 
estimates from multilevel models without covariates (for details see supplemental online 
material, section C). There was a small, statistically significant correlation between the two 
memory-experience gaps, r = -.19, p =.003. Within the affect dimensions, the memory-
experience gap was unrelated to the within-person correspondence convergence indicators, |r| 
<.03, p > .642, but positively correlated with the incremental effect of peak affect, r > .24, p < 
.001. The within-person correspondence convergence indicator for PA was positively 
correlated with the within-person correspondence convergence indicator for NA, r = .52, p < 
.001. Furthermore, the incremental effect of peak PA was not correlated with the incremental 
END-OF-DAY AFFECT  24 
 
 
effect of peak NA, r = -.10, p = .110 (for further results see Table S4 and Figure S1 in the 
supplemental online material, section C). 
Discussion 
 Results from Study 1 revealed the expected memory-experience gap for NA, but not 
for PA. Furthermore, inter-individual differences in this gap could only be found for NA as 
well. That is, participants on average reported higher NA in retrospective ratings compared to 
momentary ratings, but individuals differed in the size of this discrepancy. Part of these inter-
individual differences could be explained by participants’ age: Consistent with expectations 
derived from SST, the memory-experience gap for NA was reduced with advancing age. 
Taken together, our research hypotheses with regard to level convergence (Hypotheses 1 and 
2) were confirmed with regard to NA but not PA.  
Regarding within-person correspondence convergence, results showed strong within-
person associations of aggregated momentary ratings and retrospective ratings: Transformed 
into a correlation metric, the average within-person associations were .60 for PA and .59 for 
NA. This demonstrates, in support of Hypothesis 3, that both ratings types shared a 
substantial amount of within-person variance and were suited to differentiate “good days” 
from “bad days”. Our results provided evidence for incremental effects of the last affect 
reported on the current day: For both PA and NA, including most recent momentary affect 
improved the prediction of retrospective affect. In contrast, peak affect only predicted 
retrospective NA, but not PA, above the mean momentary ratings. That is, predictions made 
based on the peak-and-end rule were fully supported for NA (Hypotheses 4a and 4b), but 
only partially for PA (Hypothesis 4b). Finally, we found substantial inter-individual 
differences in the effects of mean, peak and recent affect on end-of-day assessments; hence, 
individuals differed in the extent to which their retrospective ratings were affected by mean 
momentary ratings, peak momentary ratings and last momentary ratings, respectively. 
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Contrary to Hypothesis 5, age did not moderate the effect of peak ratings on retrospective 
ratings. Exploratory analyses did not reveal any age differences in the impact of mean ratings 
or most recent ratings. 
Further exploratory analyses of inter-individual differences in the respective 
indicators showed that level convergence and within-person correspondence convergence 
were uncorrelated, emphasizing the importance to consider both indicators when 
investigating convergence of rating types. Furthermore, level convergence was positively 
correlated with the peak effects, which is in line with the assumption that the memory-
experience gap is driven by peak effects. Finally, the within-person correspondence 
convergence indicators were positively correlated, indicating that participants who showed 
larger correspondence convergence in PA, also showed larger correspondence convergence in 
NA. This positive association might be driven by inter-individual differences in variables 
associated with the ability to correctly recall or report emotional states such as, for example 
episodic memory. For level convergence, the association was reversed: Participants with a 
larger NA memory-experience gap tended to have a smaller PA memory-experience gap.5  
With Study 2 we sought to extend these findings in two ways: First, by including a 
wider age range, we examined potential age differences in level convergence or within-
person correspondence convergence beyond the age of 65 years which was the oldest age in 
Study 1. Second, we employed a measurement burst design (Nesselroade, 1991; Sliwinski, 
2008). In such a design, intensive longitudinal bursts (such as EMA) are repeated several 
times with the same individuals over a longer time frame which allows examining within-
person changes in intra-individual effects. In Study 2 we employed three bursts which 
enabled us to investigate potential within-person changes the convergence indicators across 
approximately 18 months.  
                                                          
5 Results involving inter-individual differences in the memory-experience gap for PA need to be interpreted very 
carefully, because these differences were only small and not statistically significant. 





The protocol of the study was approved by the Institutional Review Board at Syracuse 
University (#08-2193; Study Cognition, Health and Aging Project II). 
Participants. Data were used from a project aiming at examining the relationships 
between daily experiences of stress, affect, and cognitive functioning. Participants for this 
study were community-residing adults recruited via newspaper ads, flyers, and letters 
describing the project to potentially eligible participants in Syracuse, NY. Inclusion criteria 
were (1) aged between 20 and 80 years, (2) fluent in English, (3) having a daily waking 
schedule after 4 a.m. but before 11 a.m., (4) physical ability to operate a palmtop computer, 
and (5) lack of major cognitive impairment. Of the 214 participants who expressed initial 
interest, 22 did not meet all inclusion criteria and 12 were no longer interested after receiving 
detailed descriptions of the study protocol. Five participants did not provide information on 
relevant study variables resulting in a final sample of 175 participants. Ninety participants 
were female; the average age of the sample was 49.7 years (SD = 17.2; min = 20, max = 79). 
Slightly more than half of the participants (58.3%) identified themselves as White, 30.9% as 
Black, 3.4% as Hispanic, and 7.4% as Other. Approximately one third (32.6%) reported a 
high school degree as their highest degree, 16.6% held a Bachelor’s degree, 9.7% a Master’s 
or Doctorate, 12.0% had no degree, and 29.1% indicated Other.  
Procedure. The study started with participants completing a baseline assessment in 
the laboratory that included assessment of various questionnaires and cognitive testing. 
During this session, participants also received training on using the mobile devices (Palm 
Tungsten E2 palmtop computer) to complete the EMA/daily-diary hybrid protocol, described 
in detail below. After this session, participants followed the protocol at home for a two-day 
run-in period. After these two days, participants returned to the laboratory for additional 
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assessments and they were given the opportunity to discuss questions about the study and the 
devices with trained research assistants. After this session, participants were asked to 
complete the protocol on the mobile device for seven consecutive days and to complete up to 
seven assessments each day. In this EMA/daily-diary hybrid protocol, participants completed 
a brief survey upon waking each day, which is not included in the present work. Throughout 
the day, five random momentary assessments were prompted at semi-randomized time-points 
(spaced approximately 2-3 hours apart). At the end of each day, participants completed 
retrospective ratings of the day overall. They were instructed to self-initiate these 
retrospective surveys within 30 minutes before bed. Data were removed on days when time 
stamps indicated that the retrospective evening assessment was completed before at least one 
momentary assessment of the day (n = 14). This procedure (in-lab assessments and 
EMA/daily-diary hybrid) was repeated approximately nine and eighteen months later which 
resulted in a measurement burst design with three measurement bursts. Data from 171, 137, 
and 111 participants were available at the first, second, and third burst, respectively. Within 
the three bursts, compliance rates were satisfactory for the random assessments (burst 1: 
92.8%; burst 2: 94.1%; burst 3: 93.2%) and the evening assessments (burst 1: 86.0%; burst 2: 
83.9%; burst 3: 85.7%), respectively. Only the measures relevant for the present study are 
reported (for additional information on study materials see Neubauer, Smyth, & Sliwinski, 
2018). Data from this study have been utilized in previous research; prior publications using 
these data have targeted different research questions (Mogle, Muñoz, Hill, Smyth, & 
Sliwinski, 2019; Neubauer et al., 2018, 2019; Scott, Sliwinski et al., 2018; Stawski et al., 
2018; Zawadzki et al., 2019; Zhaoyang, Sliwinski, Martire, & Smyth, 2018).  
Measurements. As in Study 1, momentary affect was assessed at each beep during 
the waking day. Participants were asked “How ___ do you feel right now?”, with eight 
adjectives, of which four assessed NA (tense; sad; upset; disappointed) and four assessed PA 
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(happy; enthusiastic; content; excited). Responses were given on a scale ranging from 1 (not 
at all) to 7 (extremely). Responses were averaged into one momentary NA score (within-
person α = .86) and one momentary PA score (within-person α = .83). Retrospective affect 
was assessed using the same adjectives; the time frame of the stem question was changed to 
“How ___ did you feel today?”. The four PA items were averaged into a retrospective PA 
score (within-person α = .82), and the four NA items were averaged into a retrospective NA 
score (within-person α = .86), respectively. Average momentary ratings, peak ratings, and last 
ratings were created as in Study 1, again resulting in four PA variables (retrospective PA, 
average momentary PA, peak PA, and last PA) and four NA variables (retrospective NA, 
average momentary NA, peak NA, and last NA) for each day.  
Data Analysis. Overall, the data analytic strategy was similar as in Study 1. The only 
difference was that we extended the models to three-level models. In order to account for the 
dependence of observations within a burst, we added random intercepts at the burst level 
(Level 2); random slopes for substantive Level-1 predictors were only estimated at the 
person-level (Level 3).  
Results and Discussion 
Descriptive statistics, correlations, and variance component estimates are depicted in 
Table 7. Overall, correlations were very similar compared to the results in Study 1, with high 
between-person correlations of aggregated momentary ratings, peak ratings, most recent 
ratings, and retrospective ratings within the affect dimensions of r > .90, and somewhat lower 
correlations on the within-person level.  
Insert [Table 7 here] 
Mean Level Comparisons (Level Convergence). We again ran a multilevel model 
predicting affect from rating type (see Tables 2 and 3). As in Study 1, retrospective ratings of 
NA were higher than aggregated momentary ratings, b = 0.139, p < .001. Additionally, there 
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was a small but statistically significant difference for PA as well: here, too, retrospective 
ratings were higher than aggregated momentary ratings, b = 0.050, p = .004. As in Study 1, 
the random slope variance associated with the predictor rating type was significant for NA, 
χ²(2) = 17.01, p < .001, but not PA, χ²(2) = 0.98, p = .612. Entering gender, age, study day 
and burst revealed age differences in PA (higher with advancing age, b = 0.183, p = .003) and 
NA (lower with advancing age, b = -0.159, p = .004). Entering two-way interactions of rating 
type with age revealed significant age x rating type interactions for both NA, b = -0.065, p = 
.003, and PA, b = 0.035, p = .048. Figure 2 shows NA and PA ratings separately for 
aggregated momentary ratings and retrospective ratings; we used the same age boundaries as 
in Study 1 and added the age range older than 65 years as a fourth age group in order to make 
the results more comparable with the results from Study 1. As in Study 1, retrospective NA 
ratings were higher than aggregated momentary ratings, and this difference was attenuated 
with advancing age. For the three youngest age groups, the difference between retrospective 
NA and aggregated momentary NA was statistically significant: 25-40 years: b = 0.214, p < 
.001; 41-52 years: b = 0.181, p < .001; 53-65 years: b = 0.089, p = .013. For the oldest age 
group (66-79 years), the difference failed to reach statistical significance, b = 0.060, p = .079.  
In contrast to Study 1, there was an age x rating type interaction for PA. Follow-up 
analyses revealed that there was no evidence for a memory-experience gap for PA in the 
youngest three age groups, b < 0.032, p > .387, but a statistically significant difference 
between aggregated momentary ratings and retrospective ratings in the oldest age group, b = 
0.155, p < .001. In follow-up analyses, we found a significant quadratic age x rating type 
interaction for PA.6 Inspection of the regression coefficients revealed a significant age 
squared x rating type interaction, b = 0.070, p < .001, suggesting that the memory-experience 
gap for PA was accelerated with advancing age. 
                                                          
6 We again tested for nonlinear age effects by adding higher order polynomials of age into the model. This did 
not improve model fit for NA, χ²(2) < 4.15, p > .125. For PA, model fit improved when adding quadratic age, 
χ²(2) = 13.19, p = .001.  
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There was no burst x rating type interaction for either PA or NA, p > .770, hence 
providing no evidence for within-person change in the memory-experience gap across the 18 
month observation period.7  There were no gender x rating type, p > .114 for all, and day x 
rating type interactions either, p > .207 for all, and including these interactions did not alter 
the conclusions drawn (see Table S3 in the supplemental online material, section B). 
Insert [Figure 2 here] 
 In post-hoc analyses, we repeated the analyses separately for high arousal PA (mean 
of the items enthusiastic and excited) and low arousal PA (mean of the items happy and 
content). Results (see supplemental online material, section D, Table S5) showed that there 
was no main effect of rating type, and no age x rating type interaction for low arousal PA, p > 
.226. For high arousal PA, the pattern of results was the same as for overall PA: There was a 
main effect of rating type, b = 0.075, p < .001, that was moderated by age b = 0.051, p = .014. 
Following up the interaction showed that only for the oldest age group, b = 0.199, p < .001, 
but not for the three other age groups, b < 0.040, p > .322, was there evidence for a memory-
experience gap for high arousal PA.   
In summary, in support of research Hypothesis 1 there was a memory-experience gap 
for both NA and PA in Study 2. Further, age was positively associated with the memory-
experience gap for PA and negatively associated with the memory-experience gap for NA, in 
line with Hypothesis 2.  
Predicting End-of-Day Affect (Correspondence Convergence). Aggregated 
momentary ratings in NA explained 44.3% of the within-person variance of retrospective NA 
ratings. For PA, the estimate was comparable, pseudo-R² = .386 (see Table 4). Further 
including peak affect and the last available affect ratings increased explained variance for 
NA, χ²(2) = 89.59, p < .001, ΔR² = 2%. For PA, the increase in model fit was statistically 
                                                          
7 We also explored potential age-dependent within-person changes: there was, however, no age x burst x rating 
type interaction for either PA, b = 0.006, p = .790, or NA, b = -0.001, p = .970. 
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significant, as well, χ²(2) = 6.19, p = .045, but the increase in Pseudo-R² was small, ΔR² = 
.05%.  Investigating the unique effects of aggregated momentary affect, peak affect, and most 
recent affect on retrospective ratings showed that, as in Study 1, recent NA, b = 0.158, p < 
.001, and peak NA, b = 0.077, p = .012, predicted end-of day NA beyond this day’s mean 
(see Table 5, Model 7b). Again, none of the interactions of age with momentary affect ratings 
were significant, |b| < 0.016, p > .580. For PA (see Table 6, Model 9b), neither the unique 
effects of peak affect, b = -0.014, p = .716, nor recent affect, b = 0.033, p = .190, were 
significant. Including the interactions with age revealed a significant age x peak PA 
interaction, b = 0.113, p = .006. To follow up this interaction, we split the sample by age 
groups. Results revealed no significant peak effects for the youngest three age groups, |b| < 
0.117, p > .056 for all, but a significant peak effect for the oldest age group, b = 0.294, p < 
.001.  
In the final models, we examined if within-person correspondence convergence 
changes either across days or across bursts. Including the interactions of aggregated 
momentary affect, peak affect, and most recent affect with day did not improve model fit for 
either PA, χ²(3) = 0.98, p = .806, or NA, χ²(3) = 3.84, p = .279. The aggregated momentary 
affect x day interaction was not statistically significant for either PA, b = -0.012, p = .496, or 
NA, b = -0.019, p = .306, yielding no evidence for a change in within-person correspondence 
convergence across days within a burst. Including two-way interactions of burst with 
aggregated momentary affect, peak affect, and most recent affect, respectively, did not 
improve model fit for PA, χ²(3) = 5.18, p = .159; the burst x aggregated momentary affect 
interaction was not significant, b = -0.024, p = .620. For NA there was a statistically 
significant improvement in model fit, χ²(3) = 9.21, p = .027. Of the three interaction effects, 
only the burst x most recent affect interaction was significant, b = 0.058, p = .022, indicating 
that the impact of most recent NA ratings on retrospective NA increased somewhat across the 
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18 month study period. There was, however, no evidence for a change in within-person 
correspondence convergence across bursts since the burst x aggregated momentary affect 
interaction was not significant, b = 0.039, p = .445. 
Taken together, results yielded support for a robust within-person association between 
aggregated momentary affect and retrospective affect, in line with Hypothesis 3. Peak and 
end effects (Hypotheses 4a and 4b) were found for NA, but not PA. Age differences in the 
incremental effect of peak affect on retrospective affect were found for PA, but not NA. 
Hence, Hypothesis 5 was only partially supported by results of Study 2. 
Exploratory Analyses: Inter-individual Differences. Person-specific estimates were 
obtained for level convergence, within-person correspondence convergence, and the effect of 
peak affect on retrospective affect as in Study 1. Results (see Table S4 and Figure S2 in the 
supplemental online material, section C) revealed the same pattern among these indicators as 
in Study 1: The two memory-experience gaps were negatively correlated, r = -.46, p < .001. 
Within each affect dimension, the memory-experience gap was unrelated to the within-person 
correspondence convergence indicators, |r| <.11, p > .140, and positively correlated with the 
effect of peak affect, r > .20, p < .008. The two within-person correspondence convergence 
indicators were positively correlated, r = .36, p < .001, and the peak affect effects were 
uncorrelated, r = -.12, p = .130. By and large, these results supported the conclusions drawn 
in Study 1: (a) indicators of level convergence and within-person correspondence 
convergence were uncorrelated; (b) level convergence was positively correlated with the peak 
effects (suggesting an important role of peak affect for the memory-experience gap); (c) 
indicators of within-person correspondence convergence were positively correlated with each 
other, indicators of level convergence were negatively correlated with each other.8  
General Discussion 
                                                          
8 As in Study 1, results involving inter-individual differences in the memory-experience gap for PA need to be 
interpreted carefully, because these differences were only small and not statistically significant. 
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Within-person fluctuations in affective experiences have recently gained increasing 
attention in the empirical literature (e.g., Augustine & Larsen, 2012; Brans, Koval, Verduyn, 
Lim, & Kuppens, 2013). Two methods frequently employed in this context are ecological 
momentary assessments (which assess momentary affect, often several times per day) and 
daily-diary methods (which typically assess retrospective affect once at the end of the day). 
Based on theoretical accounts of reconstructive processes (Robinson & Clore, 2002), 
differences between the experiencing self and the remembering self (Conner & Barrett, 2012) 
and the peak-and-end rule (Fredrickson, 2000), differences between retrospective ratings 
(“How did you feel today?”) and aggregated momentary ratings (the mean of ratings 
throughout the day; “How do you feel right now?”) can be expected, but the degree of these 
divergences has not been thoroughly investigated thus far. Additionally, the degree of 
convergence might vary across individuals, potentially as a function of person-level 
characteristics. In the present study, we examined two indicators of convergence in two 
EMA/daily-diary hybrid studies: level convergence (defined as the absence of mean level 
differences between the retrospective and aggregated momentary ratings) and within-person 
correspondence convergence (defined as the within-person association of retrospective and 
aggregated momentary ratings). Furthermore, we examined age as one potential predictor of 
inter-individual differences in these convergence indicators. We will first discuss the findings 
on level convergence before we will turn to the findings on correspondence convergence. We 
will then integrate these findings and discuss potential mechanisms underlying the 
convergence/divergence of momentary and retrospective affect measures, as well as 
implications for studies investigating within-person fluctuations in affective experiences. 
Level Convergence: The Memory-Experience Gap 
In both studies, we found evidence for a memory-experience gap for NA, supporting 
Hypothesis 1. That is, retrospective NA ratings were higher than the average momentary 
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ratings provided throughout participants’ daily lives. This finding is in line with previous 
research (Ben-Zeev et al., 2009; Lay et al., 2016; Miron-Shatz et al., 2009; Thomas & Diener, 
1990). Most of these studies (e.g., Ben-Zeev et al., 2009; Thomas & Diener, 1990; Lay et al., 
2016) collected momentary ratings in participants’ daily lives, but retrospective ratings were 
not collected regularly at the end of each day but only at the end of the data collection period. 
Miron-Shatz et al. (2009) assessed retrospective affect at the end of the day, but “momentary” 
ratings were obtained via the day reconstruction method and not collected in an EMA. In 
contrast, our study compared momentary ratings collected in an EMA to retrospective 
assessments collected at the end of each day, thereby going beyond previous research on this 
issue. Our findings further provided evidence consistent with Hypothesis 2 for NA: Results 
revealed a linear decrease in the memory-experience gap for NA with increasing age in both 
studies.  
For PA, there was only limited evidence for a memory-experience gap in the present 
study: Retrospective PA ratings did not differ from aggregated momentary ratings in Study 1, 
and they were only slightly higher in Study 2. Follow-up analyses showed that this small 
difference was driven by the oldest age group (66-79 years), suggesting that only the oldest 
adults investigated in the present research reported more intense retrospective PA ratings than 
momentary ratings. Hence, Hypotheses 1 and 2 received mixed support for PA in our 
analyses. Previous findings on the PA memory-experience gap are rather mixed, too. 
Although both Parkinson et al. (1995) and Miron-Shatz et al. (2009) reported higher 
retrospective PA ratings than aggregated momentary ratings in their studies, in the latter 
study this gap was smaller than the respective gap for NA. Furthermore, Lay et al. (2016) 
reported a PA memory-experience gap only for high arousal PA. Taking a closer look at the 
items used to assess PA in the present study, differences in arousal captured by these items 
might help explain differences in the results obtained in the two present studies. Whereas 
END-OF-DAY AFFECT  35 
 
 
none of the four items assessing PA in Study 1 (happy; pleased; enjoyment/fun; joyful) 
captured very high arousing PA, two of the items used in Study 2 (enthusiastic; excited) are 
face-valid high arousal indicators. Lay et al. (2016) suggested that remembering high arousal 
affect would be more relevant from an evolutionary perspective than remembering low 
arousal affect, so the memory-experience gap (which the authors suggested to be a 
consequence of peak effects) should be larger for high arousal than for low arousal affect. 
Results from exploratory analyses in Study 2 were in line with this post-hoc explanation: 
Only for high arousal PA, but not for low arousal PA was there evidence for a memory-
experience gap that was exacerbated with advancing age.   
Correspondence Convergence – Discriminating Good Days from Bad Days 
In addition to the memory-experience gap, we also investigated the degree of 
correspondence convergence (relative convergence) of aggregated momentary affect ratings 
and retrospective affect ratings. Our findings showed that for both PA and NA, retrospective 
ratings collected at the end of the day were strongly associated with aggregated momentary 
ratings on both the between-person level and the within-person level. The former finding 
replicates and extends results reported in prior research (Ben-Zeev et al., 2009; Röcke et al., 
2011) and suggests that both ratings types are very well suited to distinguish persons with 
higher PA (NA) from persons with lower PA (NA). Extending prior research to the within-
person level, our results showed—in line with Hypothesis 3—a substantial within-person 
association of retrospective and aggregated momentary ratings: These two rating types shared 
between 35% and 44% of within-person variance, corresponding to a within-person 
correlation of .59 to .66. This high overlap suggests that both rating types are capable of 
differentiating days with relatively higher PA (NA) from days with relatively lower PA (NA); 
that is, both aggregated momentary and retrospective daily ratings can reasonably 
discriminate “good days” from “bad days”.  
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This finding conveys important information for researchers working with daily-diary 
studies: One advantage often claimed for this type of research is that it captures “life as it is 
lived” (Bolger, Davis, & Rafaeli, 2003). However, when asking study participants to report 
their affective experiences retrospectively (“today”), the obtained ratings might still be 
confounded by retrospective biases.9 Because emotional experiences cannot be re-lived they 
need to be reconstructed, opening up the possibility for biased assessments (Robinson 
& Clore, 2002).  
Peak and end effects might be one source of such biases: Instead of accurately 
reporting how they felt on average, individuals might rely on the most intense or most recent 
affect experienced today (Fredrickson, 2000). Across both studies, retrospective NA was 
predicted by both peak NA and most recent NA above and beyond mean momentary NA, 
supporting Hypotheses 4a and 4b for NA. Hence, although there was a strong association of 
mean momentary ratings and retrospective ratings for NA, retrospective ratings were slightly 
biased in the direction of peak and most recent affect experienced. Although our results were 
consistent with predictions made by the peak-and-end rule for NA, evidence was mixed for 
PA: recent PA predicted retrospective PA ratings only in Study 1 but not in Study 2, lending 
only partial support to Hypothesis 4a for PA. Hypothesis 4b received no support for PA, 
because peak PA had no overall effect on retrospective PA in either Study 1 or Study 2. 
Despite some incremental effects of peak and most recent affect, we hasten to add that these 
effects were quite small in magnitude (less than 3% increase in explained variance above 
mean momentary ratings). Some of the remaining discrepancies between aggregated 
momentary affect and retrospective affect might be explained by the impact of salient daily 
                                                          
9 However, end-of-day assessments are probably less prone to retrospective biases than ratings of a longer recall 
period (e.g., “How did you feel in the last four weeks?”). Hence, rather than as a dichotomy, the relative 
contributions of the remembering self / experiencing self (Conner & Barrett, 2012) or episodic / semantic 
memory processes (Robinson & Clore, 2002) to rendering the response to affect measures might be better 
represented as a continuum: End-of-day assessments probably engage less semantic processes than retrospective 
assessments of longer recall periods, but more semantic processes than momentary assessments. 
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events. Salience is one of the key mechanisms discussed to explain peak and end effects (e.g., 
Lay et al., 2016), but these two moments are probably not the only salient events an 
individual encounters in daily life. For example, when reflecting about today’s affect, an 
individual might recall her affect during an unusually pleasant interaction she has had with 
her supervisor today. This salient memory might bias her retrospective affect assessment 
towards the affect experienced during this interaction, leading to a less-then-perfect within-
person correspondence convergence that cannot be explained by peak and end effects.  
In our final hypothesis (Hypothesis 5), we predicted that the effect of peak affect on 
retrospective affect would be more pronounced with advancing age. This hypothesis was 
derived from SAVI (Charles, 2010). According to this model, old age is associated with 
vulnerabilities in the regulation of affect in situations of high levels of emotional arousal. The 
postulated adaptive value of peak affect – providing incremental information on the maximal 
capacity requirements of a situation (Fredrickson, 2000) – might therefore be particularly 
important with advancing age. Our data were only partially consistent with this prediction. 
Only for PA, and only in Study 2, did we find evidence for age-associated changes in the 
effect of peak ratings on retrospective ratings. Peak PA predicted retrospective PA only in the 
oldest age group investigated (66-79 years). 
Mechanisms and Implications 
Overall, a clear pattern of results was visible across both studies and both PA and NA. 
First, peak effects and the memory-experience gap were in all instances observed together. 
Peak NA consistently predicted retrospective NA above and beyond mean NA on this day, 
and NA consistently exhibited evidence for a memory-experience gap. For PA, which 
exhibited a memory-experience gap for the oldest adults only, we too found support for a 
peak effect only for this age group. Second, results of the analyses investigating inter-
individual differences in convergence indicators revealed that participants who exhibited 
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stronger effects of peak affect on retrospective affect (i.e., participants who were more 
strongly “pulled” towards their peak affect) also had larger memory-experience gaps. These 
results are consistent with the assumption of peak effects driving the memory-experience gap 
proposed by Lay et al. (2016).  
Furthermore, results were more supportive of our research hypotheses for NA than for 
PA. This is largely in line with previous research that has, for example, often reported a 
memory-experience gap for NA, but not (or smaller) for PA (Ben-Zeev et al., 2009; Miron-
Shatz et al., 2009), and more consistent peak and end effects for NA than for PA (Ganzach 
& Yaor, 2019; Röcke et al., 2011). On a conceptual level, the differences between NA and 
PA in this regard have often been explained by the “bad-is-stronger-than-good” hypothesis 
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). For example, Ganzach and Yaor 
(2019) suggested that peak NA is more salient than peak PA, and that therefore, peak effects 
should be stronger for the former than the latter affect dimension (and, consequently, the 
memory-experience gap should be larger for NA than for PA). If salience is indeed the 
mechanism driving peak effects and the memory-experience gap, this would suggest that 
these effects are modulated when there is a shift towards higher salience of positive 
information. According to SST (Carstensen et al., 1999), such a shift occurs with advancing 
age: The perception of reduced time to live prompts individuals to increasingly turn towards 
valuing emotional well-being over gaining information which leads to an altered information 
processing preference favoring positive (relative to negative) information. Whether this 
change in information processing style can be best understood as a decrease in negativity, an 
increase in positivity, or both, is debated. A reduction in negativity would entail that negative 
information becomes less salient, leading to a smaller memory-experience gap for NA, and a 
reduced impact of peak NA on retrospective NA. An increase in positivity should be 
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associated with increased salience of positive information, and hence a larger memory-
experience gap for PA and a larger impact of peak PA on retrospective PA.  
When interpreting our findings in light of these considerations, they hint towards two 
complementary processes that differ in their age-associated dynamics: First, the quadratic age 
effect on the memory-experience gap for PA suggests that positivity might not increase in a 
linear fashion across the life span, but only be observed among very old adults. Our results 
further indicate that only for older adults, peak PA is salient enough to “pull” retrospective 
PA ratings away from the aggregated momentary ratings. Second, the linear decrease in the 
memory-experience gap for NA across the investigated age range might indicate a reduction 
of negativity over a large part of the adult life span. However, there was no decrease in the 
effect of peak NA, suggesting that peak NA remains salient across the life span. Hence, the 
reduction (and virtual elimination) of the memory-experience gap for NA in very old adults 
cannot be explained by a reduced peak effect.  
If not salience of peak experiences, then other factors have to be considered to explain 
the age-associated reduction in the NA memory-experience gap. A decrease in episodic 
memory performance (leading to a reduced ability to remember today’s NA) that is 
compensated by recruiting semantic memory processes could be one alternative explanation: 
Given restrictions in episodic memory, older adults might use semantic information (“How 
do I think I felt?”) more so than episodic information (“How did I feel today?”). This would 
result in a weaker association between aggregated momentary assessments and retrospective 
assessments with advancing age. However, this seems to be an unlikely explanation for the 
present results, because there was no effect of age on the within-person association between 
aggregated momentary NA and retrospective NA. Because our sample comprised cognitively 
healthy individuals (major cognitive impairment was an exclusion criterion for participation 
in Study 2), cognitive decrements might not have been severe enough to lead to a worse 
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convergence in the older adults investigated here, but this could be an interesting avenue for 
future research.  
Instead, age-associated changes in reappraisal of daily events seem to be a better 
explanation for the present findings: With advancing age, participants might evaluate a 
negative experience (e.g., their NA experienced today) as less negative than younger 
individuals, leading to a smaller memory-experience gap with older age. This is in line with 
findings on the reported severity of stressful events. For example, older adults often rate the 
severity of a minor stressor in their daily lives as less severe than younger adults (Almeida & 
Horn, 2004; Neubauer et al., 2019). Notably, such differences emerged even though the 
stressors reported by younger and older adults were of the same “objective severity” (as 
obtained by observer ratings; Almeida & Horn, 2004). According to SAVI, the increasing use 
of efficient reappraisal strategies is one of the strengths associated with older individuals’ life 
long experience in emotion regulation. This use of reappraisal strategies (or other efficient 
emotion regulations strategies) might explain the age-associated reduction in the NA 
memory-experience gap despite an unaltered peak NA effect. 
In summary, our results in combination with these elaborations suggest that the PA 
memory-experience gap might increase with advancing age because peak PA is more salient 
in older adults (and hence, “pulls” retrospective affect ratings more towards peak PA). This 
increased salience of peak PA could be a result of an age-associated positivity bias that is 
only observed in old adults. The NA memory-experience gap decreases with older age, which 
might be a consequence of age-associated improvements in emotion regulation (e.g., 
reappraisal processes) that lead to a less exaggerated retrospective assessment of daily NA.  
Relevance for Intensive Longitudinal Studies 
For future studies investigating affective dynamics within-individuals, it is important 
to note that the association between mean momentary ratings and retrospective ratings was 
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substantial, but far from perfect. On the one hand, this indicates that both assessment types 
capture common sources of variation that can be used to distinguish “good days” from “bad 
days”. On the other hand, results also suggest that each assessment type has unique sources of 
variation. On a conceptual level, momentary ratings are well-suited to capture temporally 
fine-grained predictors and consequences of fluctuations in affect, whereas end-of-day 
retrospective assessments obscure temporality throughout the day. A further difference 
between these two rating types relates to the notion that retrospective assessments are, in 
some cases, expected to be more predictive of deliberate future behavior than aggregated 
momentary ratings (Redelmeier et al., 2003; Wirtz et al., 2003), whereas momentary 
assessments would often be expected to be more closely related to physiological indicators 
such as cortisol secretion or heart rate (see Conner & Barrett, 2012). Taken together, 
momentary ratings and retrospective ratings provide overlapping but not necessarily 
exchangeable information. Researchers interested in intra-individual fluctuations of affect 
need to weigh the costs and benefits of using either retrospective assessments in daily-diary 
studies (which might be slightly biased towards peak and recent affect, or other salient events 
of the day, and influenced by the use of reappraisal processes, but more readily and easily 
collected) or EMA type of data collection (which increases participant burden and might be 
more costly, but allows insight into the temporal unfolding of ebbs and flows, as well as 
predictors and consequences of within-day affect). These findings cannot provide clear cut 
recommendations regarding which procedure should be preferred, and this decision will 
certainly need to be made on a case-by-case basis in accordance with research questions and 
goals. They do, however, suggest that daily retrospective affect assessments are not heavily 
biased and can therefore provide similar (although not identical) insights into the day-to-day 
fluctuations of affect as do aggregated momentary affect ratings.   
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Future research might consider expanding the present results in several ways. First, it 
might be worthwhile to examine the effect of different time frames for the recall period on 
convergence indicators. Building on results by Charles et al. (2016) and Walentynowicz, 
Schneider, and Stone (2018), the memory-experience gap may increase when comparing 
aggregated momentary ratings to retrospective ratings over a longer time frame (e.g., 
retrospective assessments after one week instead of one day). It remains unclear, however, 
how a longer recall period might affect within-person correspondence convergence and age 
differences in the convergence indicators. Second, the results of the present study are based 
on intensity ratings of affective states, and it remains an open question whether the same 
pattern of results would emerge when using frequency ratings for the assessment of 
momentary and retrospective affect. Third, findings on inter-individual differences in 
convergence indicators suggest that level convergence and within-person correspondence 
convergence are largely unrelated. Hence, some individuals might, for example, consistently 
overestimate their NA (low level convergence), but at the same time be quite good at 
distinguishing better days from worse days in their retrospective assessments (high within-
person correspondence convergence) or vice versa. Future studies should examine, what 
processes account for these different convergence indicators (e.g., episodic and semantic 
memory; memory biases due to motivational preferences; salience) to better understand the 
properties of aggregated momentary and retrospective affect ratings.  
Strengths and Limitations 
Results of the present study are based on two age-heterogeneous samples that were 
assessed in an intensive longitudinal design for up to 14 (Study 1) and 21 days (Study 2). By 
assessing study participants’ current affect several times per day and retrospective affect at 
the end of each day, we were in a position to examine both between- and within-person 
associations of aggregated momentary assessments with retrospective assessments for both 
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PA and NA. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that approached the question 
of convergence of momentary ratings and retrospective ratings in large, heterogeneous 
samples using this strong methodological approach. Despite these strengths, a number of 
limitations must be considered. First, although both samples were heterogeneous with respect 
to age, the age range was restricted and did not cover childhood and adolescence or very old 
adulthood (e.g., Riediger, Schmiedek, Wagner, & Lindenberger, 2009). Different patterns 
might be observed when targeting, for example, a population of very old adults (80 years and 
older) for whom accumulated losses and physiological restraints overpower age-associated 
strengths in emotion regulation (Charles, 2010). Second, the age-related effects we found 
were based on cross-sectional age associations. We note that such cross-sectional effects do 
not allow firm conclusions about developmental changes because they confound 
developmental effects with cohort effects (e.g., Lindenberger, von Oertzen, Ghisletta, & 
Hertzog, 2011). Although we investigated longitudinal change in these effects in Study 2, the 
follow-up period was rather short (18 months), in particular compared to the cross-sectional 
age differences in our sample (20-79 years). Measurement burst studies with longer inter-
burst intervals are required to shed light onto the developmental dynamics at play. Third, 
momentary affect was assessed only five times per day and more intense sampling schemes 
might better capture the “true” mean and peak affect on a day. Our sampling scheme might 
have missed high intense affective states, in particular on high stress days, which might 
contribute to the less-than-perfect association between mean momentary ratings and 
retrospective ratings. Future studies should consider including more momentary ratings each 
day to better accommodate the highly volatile affective experiences in daily life. Future 
research might also consider examining the role of within-day affect variability for the 
convergence between the rating types (see Stone et al., 2005). We note, however, that 
obtaining reliable estimates of within-day variance in affective experiences would likely 
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require more than five daily assessments (e.g., Estabrook, Grimm, & Bowles, 2012; Wang & 
Grimm, 2012). Fourth, the reports of momentary affect during the day may have reinforced 
memory for end of day recall. That is, our results might be biased in favor of convergence 
due to the fact that each momentary assessment provides a prompt not only to report their 
current state, but also to encode and remember it for recall later in the day. Future studies 
might consider examining the effects of repeated momentary samples throughout the day on 
end-of-day assessments (e.g., by comparing a group of participants investigated in an 
EMA/daily-diary hybrid design to a group reporting only retrospective assessments at the end 
of the day). Furthermore, our results showed somewhat larger effect sizes for most recent 
affect (vs. peak affect). This finding might in part be driven by state dependent memory 
(given that the last assessment was close in time to the retrospective assessment). We aimed 
to reduce this overlap by collecting these measures at different occasions on the same day 
(they were on average about 3 hours apart), but future research might consider to separate 
them further (e.g., by assessing retrospective affect on the next morning).  
Conclusions 
Asking individuals to recall, summarize, and report how they felt over a certain period 
of time can result in divergence from the experiences the participants actually had during the 
targeted period – even over relatively short periods of time, such as one day. Previous 
findings on the memory-experience gap suggest that individuals overstate both positive and 
negative affect when asked to judge them retrospectively. Biasing effects of peak ratings have 
been postulated, but these peak effects have previously not been thoroughly examined from a 
within-person perspective. Our findings from two studies employing ecological momentary 
assessment/daily-diary hybrid studies comparing retrospective end-of-day assessments to 
momentary assessments collected throughout the day showed (a) a memory-experience gap 
for negative affect and (only for very old adults) positive affect, (b) very strong between-
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person correspondence among retrospective and aggregated momentary ratings, and (c) 
acceptable within-person correspondence of these two rating types. Within-day peak and 
most recent negative affect consistently predicted daily retrospective negative affect. Results 
further suggested inter-individual differences in the convergence of these two rating types 
that were partially associated with participants’ age. Overall, findings provide valuable 
information that helps inform affect research, aging theory, and methodological approaches 
to studying intra-individual processes at the day and within-day levels. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics (Study 1). 
  Correlations     





1 Age -.02 -.05 -.09 -.03 -.06 .14* .12* .14* .12*  46.2 11.1 - 
2 Gendera  .06 .06 .10 .04 -.08 -.05 -.05 -.07  0.65  0.48 - 
3 Mean Momentary 
Negative Affect 
  .97** .96** .99** -.46** -.52** -.41** -.47**  22.0 15.4 .551 
4 Retrospective 
Negative Affect 
 .60**  .96** .97** -.47** -.54** -.41** -.48**  24.7 17.0 .581 
5 Peak Negative Affect  .84** .52**  .94** -.51** -.55** -.40** -.51**  32.8 18.1 .554 
6 Last Negative Affect  .67** .49** .56**  -.44** -.51** -.40** -.46**  21.3 15.6 .551 
7 Mean Momentary 
Positive Affect 
 -.65** -.46** -.55** -.43**  .97** .96** .99**  61.5 18.9 .574 
8 Retrospective 
Positive Affect 
 -.46** -.60** -.37** -.38** .63**  .94** .98**  62.1 18.8 .598 
9 Peak Positive Affect  -.47** -.35** -.28** -.34** .80** .53**  .96**  72.3 16.9 .636 
10 Last Positive Affect  -.46** -.39** -.39** -.61** .69** .55** .59**   62.2 18.9 .563 
 SD (across days) - 7.5 14.5 16.2 14.1 9.5 15.4 12.8 16.7     
 SD (within days) - 11.9 - - - 13.7 - - -     
Note. Table depicts descriptive statistics on the between-person level (upper diagonal) and the within-person level (lower diagonal). ICC = intra-
class correlation (estimated from a two-level model as the proportion of between-person variance to the total variance). a0=male; 1=female. *p < 





Mean Level Comparisons: Level Convergence (Negative Affect). 
 Negative affect (Study 1)  Negative affect (Study 2) 
 Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a  Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b 







 2.005** (0.056) 2.121** (0.082) 2.119** (0.083) 
Rating typea 3.052** (0.360) 3.048** (0.360) 3.065** (0.357)  0.139** (0.022) 0.137** (0.022) 0.142** (0.021) 
Genderb - 1.615 (2.074) 1.617 (2.073)  - -0.142 (0.107) -0.142 (0.107) 
Age - -0.353 (0.992) -0.717 (1.005)  - -0.159* (0.054) -0.178* (0.055) 
Day - -0.062 (0.038) -0.061 (0.038)  - -0.015* (0.005) -0.015* (0.005) 
Burst - - -  - 0.007 (0.033) 0.008 (0.033) 
Age x Rating typea - - -0.810* (0.358)  - - -0.065* (0.022) 
 Random Effects (Standard Deviations)  Random Effects (Standard Deviations) 
Intercept  
(Across Persons) 
15.36 15.33 15.32  0.637 0.607 0.607 
Rating Type  
(Across Persons) 
2.11 2.11 1.97  0.105 0.103 0.087 
Intercept  
(Across Bursts) 
- - -  0.488 0.488 0.488 
Residual  
(Momentary Affect) 
9.91 9.91 9.91  0.603 0.602 0.602 
Residual  
(Retrospective Affect) 
14.48 14.47 14.47  0.824 0.823 0.823 
 
 
Note. Table depicts point estimates (standard errors for fixed effects in brackets). Age was z-standardized prior to the analyses; day was centered on 
the first day; burst (Study 2) was centered on the first burst. Number of observations: 5,777 (Study 1), 5,313 (Study 2); number of participants: 242 
(Study 1), 175 (Study 2).  





Mean Level Comparisons: Level Convergence (Positive Affect). 
 Positive affect (Study 1)  Positive affect (Study 2) 
 Model 4a Model 5a Model 6a  Model 4b Model 5b Model 6b 







 4.282** (0.062) 4.285** (0.091) 4.286** (0.091) 
Rating typea 0.406 (0.380) 0.398 (0.381) 0.405 (0.380)  0.050* (0.017) 0.051* (0.017) 0.048* (0.017) 
Genderb - -2.562 (2.544) -2.563 (2.544)  - 0.058 (0.121) 0.058 (0.121) 
Age - -2.587* (1.217) 2.682* (1.223)  - 0.183* (0.061) 0.170* (0.062) 
Day - -0.111* (0.044) -0.111* (0.044)  - 0.003 (0.004) 0.003 (0.004) 
Burst - - -  - -0.059* (0.029) -0.059* (0.029) 
Age x Rating typea - - -0.307 (0.381)  - - 0.035* (0.018) 
 Random Effects (Standard Deviations)  Random Effects (Standard Deviations) 
Intercept  
(Across Persons) 
18.91 18.66 18.66  0.749 0.738 0.737 
Rating Type  
(Across Persons) 
1.43 1.46 1.40  0.020 0.000 0.011 
Intercept  
(Across Bursts) 
- - -  0.423 0.418 0.418 
Residual  
(Momentary Affect) 
11.86 11.86 11.86  0.533 0.533 0.533 
Residual  
(Retrospective Affect) 
15.45 15.43 15.43  0.690 0.690 0.689 
 
 
Note. Table depicts point estimates (standard errors for fixed effects in brackets). Age was z-standardized prior to the analyses; day was centered on 
the first day; burst (Study 2) was centered on the first burst. Number of observations: 5,777 (Study 1), 5,313 (Study 2); number of participants: 242 
(Study 1), 175 (Study 2).  




Explained Within-Person Variance in Retrospective Affect: Within-Person Correspondence Convergence. 
 Negative Affect   Positive Affect 
 Study 1  Study 2   Study 1  Study 2 
Predictor included         
    Mean  35.3%  44.3%   38.4%a  38.6%c 
    Peak 27.1%  33.6%   26.6%  23.4% 
    Last 23.2%  26.2%   28.8%  16.0% 
    Mean + Peak 35.5%   44.6%    38.5%a   38.6%c   
    Mean + Last 36.7%   45.9%    40.9%b   38.7%d  
    Peak + Last 32.6%   39.6%   35.2%  27.9% 
    Mean + Peak + Last 36.9%  46.2%   40.9%b  38.7%d 
Unique effects1         
    Mean  4.3%**  6.6%**   5.7%**  10.8%** 
    Peak  0.2%**  0.3%**   <0.1%  <0.1% 
    Last  1.4%**  1.6%**   2.4%**  0.1%* 
Note. Table depicts Level-1 R² estimates according to Xu (2003) for retrospective affect reported at the end of the day predicted by the variables in 
the leftmost column. Within each column, percentages marked with the same superscript are not different to a statistically significant degree, p > 
.05; all other likelihood ratio tests were significant, p < .045. 
1Computed as the difference of the variance explained by the full model (all three predictors) minus the variance explained by the model including 




Predicting End-of-Day Negative Affect. 
 Negative affect (Study 1)  Negative affect (Study 2) 
 Model 7a Model 8a  Model 7b Model 8b 
 Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects 
Intercept 23.769** (1.823) 23.714** (1.821)  2.214** (0.090) 2.214** (0.090) 
Mean Momentary 
Rating 
0.579** (0.071) 0.576** (0.071)  0.691** (0.055) 0.693** (0.056) 
Peak Momentary 
Rating 
0.082* (0.036) 0.087* (0.036)  0.077* (0.031) 0.076* (0.031) 
Last Momentary 
Rating 
0.183** (0.028) 0.181** (0.028)  0.158** (0.028) 0.159** (0.028) 
Gendera 0.907 (2.210) 0.964 (2.207)  -0.175 (0.119) -0.174 (0.119) 
Age -0.948 (1.056) -1.318 (1.077)  -0.217** (0.060) -0.210** (0.062) 
Day -0.094 (0.055) -0.097 (0.055)  -0.009 (0.006) -0.010 (0.006) 
Burst - -  -0.005 (0.017) -0.004 (0.017) 
Age x Mean 
Momentary Rating 
- -0.083 (0.073)  - 0.005 (0.058) 
Age x Peak 
Momentary Rating 
- -0.008 (0.035)  - -0.009 (0.032) 
Age x Last 
Momentary Rating 
- 0.050 (0.029)  - 0.016 (0.028) 
 Random Effects  
(Standard Deviations) 
 Random Effects  
(Standard Deviations) 















0.196 0.191  0.196 0.197 
Intercept  
(Across Bursts) 
- -  0.076 0.076 
Residual 10.30 10.30  0.547 0.547 
 
Note. Table depicts point estimates (standard errors for fixed effects in brackets). Age was z-standardized prior to the analyses; day was centered on 
the first day; burst (Study 2) was centered on the first burst. Mean momentary ratings, peak momentary ratings, and last momentary ratings were 
centered on the person mean of all momentary ratings. Number of observations: 2,591 (Study 1), 2,386 (Study 2); number of participants: 242 
(Study 1), 174 (Study 2). 





Predicting End-of-Day Positive Affect. 
 Positive affect (Study 1)  Positive affect (Study 2) 
 Model 9a Model 10a  Model 9b Model 10b 
 Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects 
Intercept 62.940** (2.170) 62.980** (2.172)  4.298** (0.094) 4.299** (0.093) 
Mean Momentary 
Rating 
0.607** (0.054) 0.608** (0.054)  0.849** (0.049) 0.845** (0.048) 
Peak Momentary 
Rating 
0.000 (0.042) -0.003 (0.042)  -0.014 (0.039) -0.008 (0.039) 
Last Momentary 
Rating 
0.204** (0.027) 0.203** (0.027)  0.033 (0.025) 0.032 (0.025) 
Gendera -1.373 (2.576) -1.375 (2.579)  0.082 (0.124) 0.083 (0.124) 
Age 2.500* (1.230) 2.968* (1.343)  0.172* (0.062) 0.121 (0.065) 
Day -0.098 (0.057) -0.099 (0.057)  0.003 (0.006) 0.003 (0.006) 
Burst - -  0.014 (0.016) 0.014 (0.016) 
Age x Mean 
Momentary Rating 
- 0.019 (0.054)  - -0.095 (0.050) 
Age x Peak 
Momentary Rating 
- -0.035 (0.041)  - 0.113* (0.041) 
Age x Last 
Momentary Rating 
- 0.003 (0.026)  - -0.011 (0.025) 
 Random Effects  
(Standard Deviations) 
 Random Effects  
(Standard Deviations) 















0.215 0.215  0.180 0.179 
Intercept  
(Across Bursts) 
- -  0.082 0.085 
Residual 10.68 10.68  0.519 0.518 
 
Note. Table depicts point estimates (standard errors for fixed effects in brackets). Age was z-standardized prior to the analyses; day was centered on 
the first day; burst (Study 2) was centered on the first burst. Mean momentary ratings, peak momentary ratings, and last momentary ratings were 
centered on the person mean of all momentary ratings. Number of observations: 2,591 (Study 1), 2,386 (Study 2); number of participants: 242 
(Study 1), 174 (Study 2).  
a0=male; 1=female. *p < .05; **p < .001. 
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Table 7 
Descriptive Statistics (Study 2). 
  Correlations     





1 Age -.01 -.24* -.29** -.29** -.27** .21* .24* .12 .20*  49.7 17.1 - 
2 Gendera  -.10 -.11 -.06 -.13 .02 .06 .06 .02  0.51 0.50 - 
3 Mean Momentary 
Negative Affect 
  .97** .95** .99** -.40** -.44** -.33** -.37**  1.99 0.64 .377 
4 Retrospective 
Negative Affect 
 .74**  .95** .95** -.43** -.48** -.35** -.41**  2.13 0.72 .423 
5 Peak Negative Affect  .83** .64**  .94** -.44** -.47** -.29** -.41**  2.73  0.86 .401 
6 Last Negative Affect  .70** .60** .59**  -.43** -.47** -.37** -.41**  1.92 0.62 .358 
7 Mean Momentary 
Positive Affect 
 -.51** -.45** -.45** -.34**  .98** .94** .99**  4.33 0.77 .487 
8 Retrospective 
Positive Affect 
 -.42** -.49** -.37** -.34** .70**  .92** .98**  4.38 0.77 .537 
9 Peak Positive Affect  -.37** -.31** -.24** -.23** .82** .57**  .91**  4.99 0.67 .533 
10 Last Positive Affect  -.34** -.32** -.33** -.47** .68** .50** .52**   4.23 0.78 .498 
 SD (across bursts) - 0.45 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.40 0.42 0.43 0.43     
 SD (across days) - 0.49 0.84 1.06 0.85 0.42 0.70 0.62 0.78     
 SD (within days) - 0.74 - - - 0.71 - - -     
Note. Table depicts descriptive statistics on the between-person level (upper diagonal) and the within-person level (lower diagonal). ICC = intra-
class correlation (estimated from a two-level model as the proportion of between-person variance to the total variance). a0=male; 1=female. *p < 




Figure 1. Figure depicts negative affect (Study 1) as a function of rating type (average of momentary ratings across the day vs. retrospective ratings) 
and participants’ age.*p < .05; **p < .001. 
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Figure 2. Figure depicts negative affect and positive affect (Study 2) as a function of rating type (average of momentary ratings across the day vs. 
retrospective ratings) and participants’ age. *p < .05; **p < .001.  
 
